THE NEED TO ACQUIRE ACCURATE CASUALTY RECORDS IN NATO OPERATIONS by John Sloboda
OxfordResearchGroup | The Need to Acquire Accurate Casualty Records in NATO Operations 
 
May 2009 
 
THE NEED TO ACQUIRE ACCURATE CASUALTY RECORDS  
IN NATO OPERATIONS 
John Sloboda
 
 
 
This paper is based on a presentation to the NATO Shadow Conference “Strategies, Options and 
Solutions for NATO Reform: Towards a New Strategic Concept in 2010” organised by BASIC, ISIS 
Europe, NATO Watch and Bertelsmann Stiftung on 31 March 2009 in Brussels. 
 
 
It is trivially easy to discover the current death toll for NATO military personnel in Afghanistan since 
2001. Several official and unofficial sources exist. For instance the NGO icasualties.org shows the 
breakdown by country, and also provides a list of names, continually updated. The list contains date of 
death, name, rank, age, service branch, cause of death, place of death and hometown. This tally is 
accurate, complete and uncontested – because it is entirely based on official information, principally 
from the US Department of Defense. 
 
In contrast, it is virtually impossible to get a clear and uncontested account of Afghan civilian deaths. 
There is no agreed total and there are no comprehensive or systematic rolls of the dead. What we have 
instead is a chaotic jumble of incomplete, contradictory and contested data. No organisation has 
undertaken sustained and consistent data gathering and presentation, and so there is no agreed 
authoritative record, nor any widely respected body able to authenticate future claims to such authority. 
 
Some partial data has been put into the public domain by a variety of players. These include the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the United Nations Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), the 
NGO Human Rights Watch, the press agency Associated Press, and – with unique sustained dedication – 
the New Hampshire academic Professor Marc Herold, who from day one of the start of US bombing in 
2001 has maintained a documentary record of all reports of Afghan civilians killed by US air raids. 
 
However, these partial attempts provide incompatible data which, at current levels of disclosure, are 
impossible for third parties to verify or reconcile. Looking just at the two most recent years, 2007 and 
2008, we can observe a jumble of figures whose cumulative effect is to confuse honest enquiry, and 
sow deep scepticism regarding the motives and competence of the parties concerned. 
 
Figure 1 overleaf shows some key data for these two years. Only UNAMA provides comprehensive figures 
for both years, proposing a total civilian death toll for 2007 of 1,523 rising to 2,118 in 2008 (a year on 
year increase of 39%).1 ISAF’s figures for 2008 are 1,234 (representing 58% of the UNAMA total).2 
Meanwhile, Marc Herold provides data in support of a plausible claim that the US alone killed over 800 
civilians in 2008.3 ISAF only admits to killing 247 civilians in that year, some 30% of Herold’s total. 
 
This chaotic situation leads to an environment in which the ordinary citizen comes to believe that no 
source can be believed or trusted. This sense of general disillusionment is well expressed by an Afghan 
journalist, interviewed by the Christian Science Monitor in July 2008. 
 
Zubair Babakarkhail of Pajhwok, an independent Afghan news service, says Taliban reports enable him 
to put out stories on time. “It is difficult to reach the spokesperson of the president’s office and the 
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Ministry of Interior and often when they do return a call it is too late.” Mr. Babakarkhail says he does not 
feel that the information from the military is any more credible. “The Taliban makes claims, and the 
other side also makes claims,” he says. “We don’t believe in either.”4
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Reported civilian casualties supplied by four sources 
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There are many reasons why figures produced by different bodies don’t match up. These include 
different start and end dates of compilations, different categories of casualty included in the count, 
disagreements about the civilian status of victims, different sources of information used (e.g. eye-
witnesses, officials) or different political motivations of the data presenters (needing to downplay or 
exaggerate certain facts), different means of verifying data (means which are often obscure and 
unpublished). And finally, names of victims and dates and locations of death are not published by the 
key official sources, so there is no means of resolving differences with reference to such issues as 
double counting or missing data. 
 
A growing body of expert opinion around the world is now coalescing around the view that the time has 
come for civilians killed in conflict to be recorded with the same detail and care with which we document 
our own military losses. There are a range of reasons for doing this. 
 
Some reasons are moral. The acknowledgement and recording of individual death is a fundamental 
human and humanising impulse. This impulse transcends race, culture or status of the victim. 
 
There are reasons of truth to do this. Truth is required before any reconciliation is possible. That is why 
we have “truth and reconciliation” processes. Families will never rest until the fact of their loss is 
incorporated into the public record of their society. Having a definitive and publicly owned list takes the 
issue of casualties out of the arena of political controversy. It is hard to see how any broad societal 
acceptance of the past can happen until the truth is made public in the name-by-name fashion that will 
allow individual verification: “the list contains my dead husband”. For the same reasons, accurate and 
detailed data is crucial for justice and reparation. 
 
There are immediate humanitarian needs that casualty data can assist, in relation to determination of 
survivor needs and provision.  
 
Military commanders and strategists also need this kind of detailed data for the evaluation and 
adjustment of their own tactics, and to learn the appropriate lessons for the future. Such data allows an 
agreed baseline against which to test notions of proportionality. And publicly interrogable data at the 
level of individuals is the sort of information that can stop the toxic politics of contested casualty 
numbers.  
 
The effects of having detailed casualty data are not speculative. We can now actually observe their 
positive effects in conflict. One little-known example of this is the Bosnian Book of the Dead.5 In 2007, a 
team of researchers funded by the Norwegian Government created an integrated database with all 
available information on the 97,207 identified victims of the Bosnian War of 1992-95. It contains 
names, photographs, official records and media reports, and is open to scrutiny and the submission of 
new information by any citizen. Before the publication of this database, Bosnian political life was riven 
with inflammatory sectarian claims and counter-claims regarding the number of people killed. Figures 
ranging from 50,000 to 300,000 were bandied about, and the main effect of these claims was to fuel 
hatred and to stoke new conflicts. Since 2007, no politician or demagogue has dared mention any other 
number than 97,000. The debate on numbers is over, precisely because the number is transparent and 
verifiable. It is just a by-product of adding up the names. If anyone can prove a name to be missing, such 
missing data can be added to the database, one by one. 
 
Another important by-product of detailed incident-based casualty recording is the possibility it allows of 
assessing differential lethality of different weapons and tactics. For example, using data of this sort 
collected in the Iraq War, colleagues at Iraq Body Count were able to show that aerial bombardment was 
the form of armed violence which produced the largest proportion of child victims. Small arms fire used 
in combat situations tended to kill the smallest proportion of non-combatants.6
   
    3 OxfordResearchGroup | The Need to Acquire Accurate Casualty Records in NATO Operations 
What are the implications of all this for NATO? The world needs progressive alliances of states to 
recognise the principle that all those killed in conflict, whether military or civilian, need identifying and 
publicly recording. In order for such work to be as free as possible from corruption and contestation it 
needs to proceed within agreed international regulatory frameworks that set standards, and levels of 
accountability. And such work needs resources – trained personnel and data management systems – 
and access for personnel to data collected and held by states. 
 
The key elements of such a system are that the name of each victim and the date of their death is the 
minimum recording requirement. The identity of each victim should be made public and not hidden in 
some technocratic domain. Recording methods must be transparent and replicable. And practical 
difficulties in completing the work should be no excuse for not starting. It is necessary to do whatever is 
possible to do, and continue until the task is complete. 
 
Oxford Research Group is not a disinterested party in this: it has declared its interest as lead 
organisation in an international partnership to develop good practice in this area and promote state 
commitment to it.7 Our partnership already includes such organisations as the International Commission 
for Missing Persons, the International Centre for Transitional Justice and Human Rights Watch. It also 
has the support of a growing number of organisations around the world that already undertake casualty 
recording, as well as specialists in international law and humanitarian action and opinion-formers within 
civil society. 
 
Our hope and expectation is that NATO will see the logic and political good sense in playing a leading 
role in such an initiative, sooner rather than later. There are some encouraging signs. Earlier this month 
the US military ran a training session at Fort Leavenworth on minimising and addressing civilian 
casualties, at which there was both NATO member-country and NGO participation. 8 Such initiatives 
should be supported and built upon. Given NATO’s stated aim of protecting civilian lives, serious and 
objective monitoring of civilian deaths, conducted openly and transparently in all NATO-involved 
conflicts, is a indispensable component of accounting to the citizens of NATO member countries and the 
countries in which NATO intervenes.  
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